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Secretary of Defense William Perry

Luncheon Speech at Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan Tokyo

*April 22, 1994
(As delivered)*

Secretary Perry:

Thank you very much. Your comment reminded me of a cartoon I had seen a few months ago. It had two pictures in it, the first picture was labeled 1853 and it showed a man in a naval uniform with Perry written on it waving, banging his saber on a door marked Japan. And the second cartoon which was labeled 1994 showed the door open and a thousand Japanese cars flooding on top of this poor man who was standing out there.

In one of the most interesting books that's been written in the last five years by Professor Fukuyama, who wrote about the end of the Cold War, suggesting that the end of the Cold War could bring about the end of history -- a ringing phrase. Unfortunately, history is being written everyday -- is being written in the dusty streets of Mogadishu, in the hills around Gorazde and in the nuclear laboratories in Yongbyon. And as it is being written it poses very real security challenges to the United States and to its Allies around the world. ==

Today, I want to talk about the security challenges in Northeast Asia. Both the challenges we face today and the challenges that we will be facing in the years ahead.

These challenges, coupled with our immense economic interests in

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the region are the basis for the United States continued security commitments in Northeast Asia. The message I want to deliver today is that the United States is fully and deeply committed to the security of this region and we will maintain a solid security presence here.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher has said no area of the world is more important for us than the Asia Pacific region. The reason for this is well known. Northeast Asia holds the world's fastest growing economies. By the first years of the next century, East Asia and the Pacific will likely account for one-third of the world's economic activity. And the markets created by this regions economies are increasingly critical to the economic health of the United States.

Last year our trade with the Asia Pacific region amounted to over 370 billion dollars. Forty percent greater than our trade with Europe. Almost three million U.S. jobs depended upon this trade. In particular the growth of Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan since the second world war has been nothing short of phenomenal. But the foundation of this sustained economic growth is peace and stability in the region, and Northeast Asia's peace and stability has been largely the result of America's military strength and its commitment to this region.

Our military presence in the region since the Second World War has guaranteed peace, defeated aggression and deterred war in Northeast Asia. It has promoted economic cooperation. It's protected the sea lanes and assured access to oil from the Middle East. It has denied political or economic control of the region by any hostile power or combination of powers, and incidentally, not incidentally it has contained defense spending in the region allowing developing countries to use more of their resources to promote economic growth.

The centerpiece of America's commitment has been the structure of bilateral mutual defense relationships between the United States on the one hand and our key Allies, particularly Japan and the Republic of Korea. And the most dramatic evidence of our commitment to this region is the presence of the American men and women in uniform who risk their lives everyday far away from home, in order to maintain the peace. --

Now for more than four decades, the threat to peace and stability in this region has been dominated by the dynamics of the Cold War. And now with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, this has generated unavoidable questions about the rationale for our system of alliances and the rationale for our continued security presence in Northeast Asia. But rather than suggesting an American withdrawal from Asia, the new challenges faced by Asia underscore the importance of a continued

American presence in this region. Indeed, I believe that these new challenges mean that America's engagement in Northeast Asia will continue to be a unique and a critically important factor to the stability and prosperity of this region. America alone has been able to forge the common interests between nations of the region where history has created deeply divisive forces.

To deal with the new challenges facing us, President Clinton outlined his vision of a new Pacific community when he came to Asia last summer. He stated that this community will be built on shared strength, shared prosperity and a shared commitment to democratic values. He clearly stated America's security priorities in Asia. First, a continued American military commitment to the region; second, stronger efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; third, new regional dialogues on security challenges; and fourth, support for democracy throughout the region.

As we are learning elsewhere in the world we cannot always predict the challenges of the future. They will emerge in unexpected ways and in unexpected places. But I want to start today by talking about one specific immediate challenge already facing us and outline an approach which will help us deal with that and help deal with others that are still unforeseen.

The most immediate threat to Northeast Asia's security emanates from North Korea. North Korea has a massive conventional military force that consumes about twenty-five percent of its gross domestic product which effectively impoverishes its people. If you compare the twenty-five percent that North Korea invests in its military, compared with the little over three percent in the United States and most Western European countries, and one percent in Japan, you get a very clear picture of why the people in North Korea suffer economic deprivation.

Two-thirds of its million-man army is based within fifty miles of the DMZ and much of this force is less than fifty miles from Seoul. This army has thousands of tanks and artillery pieces. It has built large tunnels under the DMZ and it has established a very large complement of special operation forces. For decades, this excessive military force has threatened the South, and in the last few years, North Korea has actually increased the size and the forward deployment of their army. Notwithstanding this build up, there can be no doubt that the combined forces of the Republic of Korea and the United States can decisively defeat the North Korean Army. ==

During the last few years, a new development has emerged on the scene and that is a major nuclear weapons program in North Korea. While there are many elements of this program still hidden, we know with certainty that they have an operational 25 megawatt

reactor, they have a 200 megawatt nuclear reactor under construction, they have a large reprocessing plant for separating plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel, they have radio chemistry laboratories and they have high explosive testing facilities. A nuclear weapons program is the only plausible explanation for these known facilities.

We also know that the 25 megawatt reactor, as we speak, has a load of spent fuel which when reprocessed could provide enough plutonium for perhaps four or five nuclear bombs. Therefore, we believe that it is critically important that the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, be present at the unloading of this reactor to provide safeguards that the spent fuel is not diverted to a weapons program.

The last time the reactor was unloaded, it was done without the knowledge of the IAEA and we can only estimate how much was unloaded. We believe that this fuel was diverted to a bomb program. Indeed our Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. James Woolsey, has estimated that the plutonium in that unloading may have been used to already build one or two nuclear bombs. To make matters worse, North Korea is building ballistic missiles of increasing range. It can already launch scud missiles against virtually any target in South Korea and it's developing longer-range missiles that could strike targets in Japan, China, Russia and other parts of the region.

Compounding our concern is North Korea's history of exporting weapons technology, including ballistic missiles, to areas of instability in the world. In short, if North Korea develops nuclear weapons, we face a greatly increased danger that other hostile rogue states around the world will soon have them also. The ruling regime in North Korea today is pursuing policies that increasingly isolate it from the world both economically and politically. Its official rhetoric has often been extreme, most recently the infamous threat that they would turn Seoul into a sea of flames. While we do not take every extreme North Korean figure of speech literally, we would be imprudent not to take seriously the threat posed by their large conventional forces, their nuclear weapons development program and their harsh rhetoric. ==

Now how the United States and its Allies in Northeast Asia respond to the challenge posed by North Korea will be critically important to the future security in this region. Our response now will be a benchmark for our responses to other challenges in the future. There are basically three ways that the United States and its Allies in the international community can deal with the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program. First of all quite obviously we could do nothing; secondly we could consider the application of military pressure; and third we could

pursue a diplomatic strategy to try to persuade North Korea that it is in their best interest to give up their nuclear weapons program.

The first option is untenable. Whatever dangers we face now in dealing with North Korea's nuclear programs, the dangers will be compounded two or three years from now if North Korea is able to produce deliverable nuclear weapons at a rate of about a dozen a year, which is compatible with the size of the facilities that we see. An unchecked nuclear capability in North Korea, coupled with its massive conventional military forces could undermine the security of the Northeast Asia region and tempt other countries to seek their own nuclear weapon programs in self defense. A nuclear North Korea could export nuclear technologies and weapons to terrorist or rogue regimes around the globe, unleashing a nightmare spread of nuclear threats.

It is therefore not just a regional problem, it is a problem for the whole world. These considerations make doing nothing an untenable option. At the other end of the spectrum would be the application of military pressure. But even limited application of military pressure entails the risk of a large scale war. Although we should not rule out any option for all time, this course should only be considered when all other possibilities have been exhausted.

That leads to the third option -- the diplomatic strategy, and that is the one we are vigorously pursuing. The first step is to work hand in hand with the Republic of Korea to continue pursuing firm, patient and imaginative negotiations with North Korea. This takes enormous patience. I can tell you from having participated in them.

Our first priority, as we pursue negotiations with North Korea, is for North Korea to give IAEA inspectors full, immediate and complete access to their nuclear facilities. We want North Korea to comply fully with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the inter-Korean denuclearization accord. These are agreements they have already signed. All we are asking is that they comply with them. ==

The overall goal that we have in our policy is a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and a strong international non-proliferation regime. I think it is important to understand just what is at stake in the diplomatic process. On the one hand, what is at stake is obvious -- the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Less obvious is the other side of the coin -- what is at stake for North Korea. The answer is a hell of a lot.

The United States, after close consultation with the Republic of Korea and Japan has agreed to pursue a thorough and broad

approach in negotiations with North Korea, if we can get back to the negotiating table. What this thorough and broad approach means in non-diplomatic jargon, is that the United States is fully prepared to discuss with the North not just the nuclear issue that is of concern to us, but the full range of issues of concern to them: diplomatic, political, economic and security.

In short, if the North is willing to live up to its international and bilateral nuclear obligations, we have made it clear that both we and our allies are prepared to move towards more normal political and economic relations with the North. The North would no longer find itself internationally isolated and increasingly impoverished. It is a positive vision, and we hope the North embraces it. Kim II Sung has recently declared that North Korea has no nuclear bombs, no desire to make nuclear bombs and no secrets about such activities. There is an easy way for him to convince the world of this -- by fulfilling North Korea's commitments to the IAEA and letting inspections go forward.

Although our diplomatic approach has been marked with great patience, President Clinton has correctly noted that "our goal is not endless discussions, but certifiable compliance."

If the international community cannot convince North Korea to honor its non-proliferation commitments, the U.N. Security Council will again take up the issue and the North will face increasing pressure in the form of sanctions.

In particular, if North Korea breaks continuity of safeguards, for example by unloading the spent fuel in its reactor without IAEA inspection, the United States will request the UN to impose sanctions on North Korea.

I believe that in that request, we will be joined by the Republic of Korea and the government of Japan. We believe that such a response would be reasonable and not provocative. However, North Korea has stated that the imposition of sanctions would amount to a declaration of war. ==

This is probably another example of excessive North Korea rhetoric, but as the Secretary of Defense for the United States, I have a responsibility to provide for the adequate readiness of U.S. military forces in the face of such threats.

Therefore, if the United Nations is moving toward imposing sanctions on North Korea, I will take the steps necessary to improve the readiness of U.S. forces and request comparable actions by the Republic of Korea.

During this process, it will be critically important to maintain solidarity with South Korea and Japan, and our other friends and

allies in the region on defense and security matters. As we pursue a diplomatic solution, it is vital that we continue to maintain a strong U.S. and South Korean defense capability on the peninsula to dissuade North Korea from acting rashly. Certainly, we will not start a war. And it is also true that we will not deliberately provoke a war with imprudent actions. But, we will not invite a war by letting our military readiness erode or by letting our alliances weaken.

Japan, South Korea and the United States must stand together on this problem. It is clear that today America must maintain a security presence in the region. There is every reason to believe that the challenges of tomorrow will require the same posture. To a large extent, the end of the Cold War has changed the problem, but it has not changed the solution.

More specifically, it is clear that there is a continuing need for credible military forces that can respond to crises and deter aggression. For the foreseeable future, there is no substitute for reliance on the bilateral commitments with our allies in the region. Under these arrangements, U.S. forward-deployed forces together with the allied forces will provide the needed deterrence.

The U.S.-Japan security treaty has been the centerpiece of the bilateral arrangements that have managed regional peace and prosperity in this region for more than four decades. These U.S. security guarantees are vital to Japan. And the U.S.-Japan relationship is also vital to the United States. In fact it is the linchpin of our security policy in the region.

The comprehensive review of America's conventional forces which we completed last year -- the so-called Bottom Up Review -- reaffirmed the United States commitment to a forward-based force structure in the region. To support U.S. commitments in Asia, we will maintain a level of approximately 100,000 troops in Korea, Japan, and afloat in the Pacific, as many as we now have in Europe. This review also underscored the importance of rapid deployment, improved airlift, improved sealift and preposition of military assets to ensure that our forces can more quickly deploy in a crisis.

The Japanese archipelago affords U.S. forward deployed forces strategically crucial naval, air and ground bases on the periphery of the Asian land mass. Japan hosts the Seventh Fleet, the Third Marine Expeditionary Force, and significant air force and army assets. Under our treaty arrangements, these forces have a regional role, and are quickly deployable to where ever they are needed.

Let us not overlook also the benefits of this relationship to

Japan. It provides security for Japan's 125 million people and confirms the regional perception that Japan shares the goal of regional stability. Japan's circumscribed military is Japan's choice. The Japanese policies against nuclear weaponry, international arms sales, and its modest defense budgets and lack of power projection capability are consistent with the Japanese Constitution and the popular will of the Japanese people. Thus there can be no doubt that the people of Japan are committed to peace.

In the future, maintaining peace and stability in this region will require us to continue to build on our partnership. And as we do this we want to develop and strengthen our capability for peacekeeping. Indeed I believe that peacekeeping will become an increasingly important mission for all of our forces. Japan's contribution of personnel and financial support to such operations is welcomed by the international community. We want to work together to enhance both our capabilities in this area.

The President's vision for a Pacific community "where economic competition is vigorous but peaceful; where diverse nations work as partners to improve their shared security; and where democracy, as well as balanced military strength, takes its place as a guardian of security." In short, the new Pacific community envisioned by the President will help us respond to the uncertain threats and challenges of tomorrow.

The idea of a new Pacific community includes an enhanced role for broader security dialogues and cooperation among the nations of the region that will complement the existing system of bilateral ties. As you know, this process is already underway. The newly established ASEAN Regional Forum, for example, will meet for the first time this summer, bring together 18 nations, including China and Russia, to engage in dialogue on regional security concerns and help promote multilateral cooperation.

A critically important part of overall efforts to increase regional security dialogue and cooperation will be efforts to engage the Peoples' Republic of China. We are already seeking China's support for our non-proliferation efforts in North Korea. We need to help China accelerate its integration into global systems of trade, finance, and security regimes, such as those dealing with the regional and global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On a bilateral basis, the United States has re-opened a high-level dialogue with China's military leadership. We have also established a Joint Defense Conversion Commission with China, of which I am the chair. We are hopeful that these openings will strengthen China's participation in efforts to increase regional cooperation.

While the Cold War was often terrifying, it also gave us many

certainties about the way we would expect the world to work. We had somehow learned to live with it. But it is a big mistake to pine for the good old days of the Cold War. In the words of the Roman poet Ovid, "Let others praise ancient times. I am glad that I was born in these." The challenges and the difficulties are great, but the opportunity to create a peaceful, stable and prosperous world is even greater. We are driven in our work by the sense that, if we do our jobs well, we can help lay the foundation for a Twenty-first Century of democracy, peace and prosperity. Together we can build a new Pacific community.

I'd like to close with a quote from one of my favorite novelists Graham Green, who said, "There always comes a moment in time when a door opens and lets the future in." The ending of the Cold War has not been the ending of history, but it has opened such a door, and the future is out there waiting to come in. All of us have a stake in that future. And by our actions, by the plans and the programs that we develop, we can shape that future, instead of being shaped by it.

Thank you very much.

Q: In your discussion of Japan's role in North Korea in the effort to get them to give up the bomb, I have two questions. The first is whether or not you feel that Japan has prepared the Japanese public for this issue. There have been no speeches like the one that you've given today, given by Japanese politicians. And secondly, whether in the course of your discussions you feel that Japan is ready, either within or without a UN framework, to cut down on the flow of money that is running between here and Pyongyang, and whether or not you feel that would be an effective first sanction? Along the way, if you can say whether you've had any discussions of whether Japan would allow the U.S. to use bases here in the imposition of sanctions if need be?

Secretary Perry: I'm probably not the right person to comment on the extent to which the Japanese public is prepared for these issues. I did see in the -- Ambassador Mondale gave me an excerpt from a paper today which showed the results of a poll which suggested that some large percentage of Japanese, I think the number was seventy percent, were prepared to support sanctions in the issue of the North Korean nuclear weapons. I can't give you any personal verification of how that poll was conducted or what its validity, but it would seem to suggest that there is a level of awareness in the Japanese public on the issue. Secondly, if sanctions were to be imposed one of the most important elements of that would be restricting the flow of money that goes from Japan to Korea and I cannot speak for the Japanese government but I believe that they would be prepared to fully cooperate to try to make that happen.

What little I know about how that money flows, I believe that would be a difficult sanction to enforce so I don't want to make light of that at all. In terms of the use of Japanese bases, we have status of forces agreement giving us access to the bases and as nearly as I -- and I believe those would be adequate for the need that we would have, and I believe that the Japanese government would be prepared to sustain those.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Russians--well, actually the Soviets -- supplied all the equipment for the nuclear program, at least the early phases of it, to what extent have you been able to secure their cooperation, or to what extent you find they are still useful at trying to possibly control this program, or what happens with it or give you more concrete information about it? And secondly, how much leverage in your judgement do you think the Chinese actually have on North Korea? I'm asking not in terms of information, but rather how you assess it for your own dealing with the question that is can they be really as useful as you want them to be or are they in no such position?

Perry: In terms of the Soviet involvement with the North Korean program, I have discussed this issue in considerable detail with my Soviet interlocutors including the senior officials in the ministry of defense and in their atomic energy agency. They tell me and I believe them based on the evidence that I see that they have had no involvement in this program for many, many years, probably for a decade or so. Secondly, I believe that without question, that Russia is not involved in any way with the program today nor providing any assistance to it. And third, I believe them when they say that they sincerely desire that there not be a nuclear weapon program in North Korea and have done several things in a diplomatic way to try assist us in that regard. I think they have very limited leverage in the case, but I think that their objectives are the same as our objectives there.

In terms of the Chinese they have told me and I think there's a certain truth that they think they do not have great leverage. Part of the reason they believe that is because they have had robust--they have been developing robust trade with South Korea in the last number of years and that has tended to alienate North Korea from them. Notwithstanding that, I think China is the best hope in terms of any leverage to be applied against North Korea. It's not that they have so much, it's that everybody else has so little. So on a relative basis they are probably our best in that regard and we have certainly discussed this with them very directly and sought their cooperation. ==

They tell us and I believe their sincerity, that they are opposed to North Korea achieving a nuclear weapon program and they will try to do what they can to discourage that. When it comes down to seeing whether what they can do would include supporting a

sanctions resolution,, I would not go out on a limb to try to forecast an answer to that one.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have referred to enhancement of preparedness of the Korean forces and U.S. forces and you have also referred to possible economic sanctions. If the situation develops as was described like that, what kind roles specifically do you want the Japanese armed forces to engage in?

Perry: We would first of all we want and I believe we will get complete support from the Japanese government in our diplomatic initiatives. Secondly we would want and I believe we would get support from the Japanese government for any move toward sanctions and third in terms of support for the military we would want and I believe we would get Japan to continue to honor their base force agreements.

Q: Mr. Secretary you have not referred to it directly, but I wonder if you could tell us what you know about the letter from the North Koreans to the IAEA offering to allow inspectors in for removal of the spent fuel rods, and what your reaction is to that please?

Perry: We understand that the North Korea and IAEA will meet to discuss arrangements for inspectors to be present during the fuel discharge at the 25 megawatt reactor. Parenthetically let me say you read sometimes about 25 megawatts and sometimes about five megawatts its the same reactor. One is an electrical measure and the other is a thermal measure. So don't be confused by that.

Secondly, we welcome those talks between IAEA and North Korea, but we also understand that North Korea in this letter states its intention to reload the reactor and we regard that as a step in the wrong direction. We call on North Korea to allow IAEA not only to be present at the unloading, but to finish the inspections that they agreed to during the February 15th agreement, so that the IAEA can ensure that there's no diversion of North Korean plutonium separation facility. ==

We understand that the offer has been made to meet with the IAEA. The IAEA has agreed to the meeting, but has stated very clearly that for them to be willing to go to Yongbyon again they need to have a clear understanding of what it is they will be allowed to do when they get there, and they have a statement of what their technical requirements are so that when they return from there they will be able to make a certification in which they confidence. So I believe there's a discussion ahead of us yet between the IAEA and North Korea about the extent to which North Korea will allow those technical requirements to be met.

Q: Just a brief follow-up. Are you asking that the reactor be

shut down after the fuel rods are removed and is that a condition regarding sanctions?

Perry: I should say right off we're not asking anything. This is a negotiation between the IAEA and North Korea, and the set of requirements they have is a fairly complicated set of requirements. I don't think it would be appropriate for me to comment on them, but it is very clear that IAEA believes that they need more than just physical presence at Yongbyon at the time of that removal.

Q: Mr. Secretary, one of the elements of friction between Japan and the U.S. in defense has been the costs of maintaining the U.S. forces here in Japan. Can you tell us please if in talks with Japanese officials if this has been brought up?

Perry: We have an agreement with Japan which runs out in, I believe, a year on burdensharing. We think this is a fair agreement and our only objective in this regard is to extend that agreement on into the future, and we believe that Japan has been exemplary in their burdensharing of the forces in this region.

Q: If the United Nations is unable to agree to sanctions, and the United States considers sanctions important because of continued North Korean refusal, what would it expect Japan to do? That is to say if the United States wanted to impose sanctions regardless of what the UN does?

Perry: The question is hypothetical and hard to answer in that respect. I would make only the one comment, which is if we and Japan and South Korea requested sanctions, and the United Nations for one reason or another was not able to agree to it, then I believe that we would then seek a way of imposing some sort of multinational sanctions, even they did not involve every nation in the world. The reason I cannot be more specific than that is that it depends very much on the circumstances of the turndown, which nations were opposed to it and for what reasons, and until I knew that I could not be more definite in answering the question.

Q: Getting back to Japan's role in the North Korean nuclear crisis. After much debate the coalition parties finally hammered out a policy statement last night which turned out to be rather vague and watered down, so I'm wondering your reaction to that, were you disappointed by the policy statement that eventually came out and what does it signal for future multilateral cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue?

Perry: No I was not disappointed at the statement that came out. I might say that having been a student for many decades of party platforms in the United States I have not developed enormous

expectations of what -- of the value of such platforms.

Nevertheless, I think that the coalition performed a useful exercise in coming together, and trying to state a framework on policies to which they could all agree when you have such a diverse coalition it gives some coherency to have such a statement but that it caused the coalition to diverse, its certainly not surprising that the agreements lack specificity in some important respects. Beyond that I think it would be inappropriate for me to comment on Japanese internal political questions and I'll just pass on the rest of that.

Q: Secretary you give the image that the United States would be completely satisfied with the Japanese cooperation in terms of contingency, however, as you know the United States Government has been asking Japan to conclude acquisition and cross servicing agreement just like you have agreement with NATO countries but Japan has not come up with that yet and also that under the Japanese self defense forces law except for the status agreement, Japanese military cannot really cooperate with the United States forces. Do you really think Japan is a reliable ally with that acquisition and cross servicing agreement?

Perry: Yes I think Japan is a reliable ally. If I look at the details of our cooperation program I could criticize it in a number of respects from the point of view of Japan's performance I can criticize it from a number respects from the point of view of the United States performance.

When I say I'm satisfied I mean not only from where we stand today but the spirit and the motivation and the goodwill of the Japanese government to work with us on making improvements and I am very much impressed, particularly with the discussions that I had here today, and last night with the good spirit of cooperation and with the desire to strengthen our alliance and to strengthen our cooperation.

I would tell you quite candidly if I were concerned withspirit of cooperation. I do not see that I see a very good spirit of cooperation here and I think we will work together on these problems and cross servicing as you rightly point out is one that should be at the high end of the list of areas that need improvement.

Q: Mr. Secretary, during your presentation that if the UN were seen to be moving toward sanctions that you would take necessary steps to improve U.S. forces in South Korea. I wonder could you be a bit more specific on that? You've already sent Patriot missiles what other measures do you regard as necessary to strengthen U.S. forces, and could you also say if a war were to break out is it current U.S. strategy as the South Koreans have

been suggesting to go all the way to Pyongyang and actually end the North Korean regime or would you just go as far as the DMZ? One might laugh but this is a serious suggestion which South Korean military have been talking about this recently.

Perry: I've only been Secretary of Defense for three months but I learned there are some questions I shouldn't answer. And one of them is a description of what our war plans are and the question about where we would go in a Korean war is really as you can imagine spelled out in considerable detail in our contingency plans, but it is not one that I am at all free to discuss.

The improvement of the readiness of the forces is a fair question, but one that I am reluctant to discuss, and I will just give you some general rationale of why it is a difficult issue. We have a delicate balance to maintain if we're moving into a regime of sanctions which based on North Korea's view of sanctions you would have to prudently say it would increase the risks on what maybe only a small amount but still somewhat. Therefore that pressures us into increasing our readiness.

On the other hand some steps we can take in increasing readiness are themselves provocative. That is they add to the further risk of war and so we have to be very careful to balance. We have I can assure you a long and detailed list of steps we want to take to improve readiness and which ones have the highest priority but we also have them divided into those that are provocative and those that are not provocative.

Our judgement, however, of what's provocative maybe different from the North Koreans. I never imagined that anybody would consider the deployment of Patriots as a provocative act. There is hardly a system that you can imagine that is more defensive and less offensive than the Patriot. It has no capability at all except to defend itself against a scud or missile attack. So its entirely limited to that one function.

Nearly every other major weapon system in the United States forces has both offensive and defensive capabilities its harder to make that distinction. The Patriot is not it is one of the few systems that we have which is entirely a defensive system. But that is this long winded answer is by way of saying that I'm sorry I cannot answer your question as to which particular readiness and proven steps we would take first.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us the results of your conversations with the Japanese about the presence of Japanese steel in the processing facility at Yongbyon? And secondly, when you talk about sanctions that the United States would seek in the event that North Korea does not allow satisfactory inspections of its unloading of the reactor at Yongbyon, what type of sanctions

are you thinking about requesting? Would these be economic sanctions, would these be what kinds of sanctions? You've said in the past I think that sanctions can be purchased by the yard and come in different grades?

Perry: On the first question, we did not have that discussion. Notwithstanding the fact that we had anticipated it, we did not hold that discussion.

On the second question on the sanctions this is an issue which of course the United Nations would be the -- assuming these would be UN sanctions would make the ultimate determination. We would with the Japanese and South Korean governments, we would seek to agree on a proposal of how to proceed on that, and it would be a phased approach, where the first level of sanctions would be modest, would strictly be economic, and would be ones that do not have harsh enforcement regimes associated with them.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the latest developments in the attempts to solve two major challenges in the world in Bosnia and in North Korea give us impression that the United States and Russia, in some sense, lack the mutual understanding which maybe something that gives the impression that maybe the Cold War begins again, or maybe it hasn't finished yet. And actually how do the United States regard the Russian proposal on the way to convene the international conference on the North Korean issue with the participation of China, United States, Russia, South Korea, North Korea and Japan? And secondly there are reports about the possibility of another airstrikes in Bosnia and especially in the mainland of Serbia. Do you consider that these airstrikes may be effective just make the Serbs to listen to the voice of the international community thank you?

Perry: Those were all very penetrating questions and I could build a whole talk around trying to answer those but let me try to pick a few of the most important ones.

I do not believe there's any likelihood that the Cold War will begin again and I do believe that the United States and Russia will maintain not only correct relationships with each other, but warm and friendly relationships with each other. I have dedicated myself and will continue to dedicate myself to enhancing that prospect. I have visited Russia three times in the last six or seven months specifically to develop and promote that close working relationship with my counterpart General Barshof (phonetic) and his deputy Andrei Kokoshin (phonetic).

In various talks I have given and in my description of what I think my job as the Secretary of Defense is the large overarching issue if I list two or three of them number one is to take every action we can take in the United States, every action which I can

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take in the Department of Defense, to ensure that the Cold War does not begin again. That would be an unparalleled disaster for Russia, for the United States, and indeed the whole world and there's no reason we should let that happen.

Now specifically about Bosnia and the Russian proposal for a conference, I don't want to sign up to any particular proposal from the Russians, and relative to a conference for dealing with the problems, but let me be very clear on saying that I think we must work arm and arm with the Russians not after disasters have happened but in working together with them to prevent problems. I have discussed this with General Garchof (phonetic), the President of course has discussed it with President Yeltsin, Secretary Christopher has talked about it with Mr. Kozyrev.

I believe that after a, shall I say, rocky beginning where the consultation was less than perfect, that we both now understand that and we both understand that the best chance of bringing peace in Bosnia comes through getting the combatant parties to the negotiating table and the best chance of that happening is that the United States and Russia both use their best offices to try to make that happen and to work creatively to try to find a formula which we can get the combatants to agree to stop the fighting and to stop the killing in Bosnia.

Thank you very much.

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WASHINGTON POST

Apr. 23, 1994

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Perry Warns North Korea Of Sanctions

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

TOKYO, April 22—Defense Secretary William J. Perry warned today that Washington will seek to impose some form of economic sanctions against North Korea next month if the country fails to allow a satisfactory international inspection of its planned withdrawal of spent fuel from a nuclear reactor.

Perry said that during his visit this week to South Korea and Japan, senior government officials assured him of their support for such a move. He also said that if China, an ally of North Korea, blocked U.N. Security Council approval of any sanctions, Washington would still try to enlist other nations in a trade embargo.

Perry's statements were prompted by U.S. concern about North Korea's statement in a letter to the interna-

tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) this week that the spent fuel in a five megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon complex will soon be withdrawn. U.S. officials say the fuel is laden with sufficient plutonium for North Korea to produce four to five nuclear weapons in addition to the estimated one or two such weapons Pyongyang may already possess.

North Korea's letter said that IAEA inspectors are welcome to witness the fuel withdrawal process to ensure that the plutonium is not diverted to nuclear arms. But the letter did not say how much access the agency's inspectors could have or how long they could continue to monitor the fuel once it is withdrawn and placed in storage.

U.S. officials said Perry's remarks were meant to give the IAEA leverage in discussions with North Korea aimed at reaching an accord on details of the inspection. They said they expected the IAEA to demand not only that the fuel be subject to continuous monitoring, but also that it be sampled to determine how long it has been in the reactor's core.

They said that such an analysis could shed light on how much plutonium already has been extracted from spent reactor fuel for North Korea's alleged nuclear weapons program.

"It is very clear that the IAEA believes that they need more than just [a] physical presence" during the defueling, Perry told reporters at the Foreign Correspondents Club here.

If North Korea blocks the new IAEA inspection, Perry said, the United States "will request the U.N. to impose sanctions" on North Korea. But if the United Nations were "not able to agree," Perry said, "we would then seek a way of imposing some sort of multinational sanctions" involving Japan, South Korea and other nations. He added that any sanctions would be imposed in phases, with the first phase likely to be of modest scope.

North Korea presently has limited economic ties to other countries, and some U.S. experts have argued that without China's support, sanctions may not have much effect. China is a major oil supplier to North Korea.

PACIFIC STARS & STRIPES

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Perry, in Tokyo, advocates unity

★ Defense secretary says U.S. and South Korea forces are ready, but calls for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue.

From Stripes and wire reports

TOKYO — Arriving here Thursday, Defense Secretary William Perry told his Japanese counterpart that Japan and the United States must join hands to force North Korea to prove Pyongyang's claim it isn't making nuclear weapons.

He and Japan Defense Agency Director General Kasuo Aichi agreed on this, reports said, with Perry emphasizing that restraint and patience were needed in seeking a diplomatic solution to the crisis — with last-resort sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council if this approach fails.

Perry left Seoul Thursday, saying U.S. and South Korean troops are at a high state of readiness and that he is satisfied with military contingency planning on the peninsula.

He also warned that North Korea could have enough plutonium "within a few weeks" to build four or five nuclear weapons, but said Washington and Seoul would "pursue diplomacy firmly and patiently until there is no hope" that diplomacy will resolve the dispute over Pyongyang's development of such weapons.

The Korea Broadcasting System said the North Koreans sent a telegram to Seoul, offering to allow International Atomic Energy Agency officials

watch as fuel rods in the reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear facility are changed. This could give IAEA inspectors some idea of how much plutonium, critical for bombs, is produced. Perry — who arrived in Seoul Tuesday and met with President Kim Young-sam, Defense and Foreign Ministry officials and U.S. commanders — told a press conference that if diplomacy fails, the United States will seek United Nations economic sanctions against the North.

Meanwhile, soldiers at U.S. bases in South Korea were unpacking and setting up Patriot anti-missile missiles that arrived here Sunday. Perry said the Patriots were sent here as part of a "regular modernization program," not in response to the nuclear crisis.

The weapons — which he emphasized are "purely defensive with no offensive capability at all" — would remain here even if the nuclear issue is resolved.

The U.S. defense chief appeared to bridle slightly when asked by a South Korean reporter if the missile deployment and Perry's visit were part of a plan to sell Patriots to the South Korean military.

"I'm not a salesman," he said. "My responsibility is to provide joint readiness to defend this country. I did not discuss (in meetings with ROK officials) procurement of the Patriot or any other American weapons system."

He said the United States "knows with certainty" that North Korea is involved in a nu-

clear weapons development program.

"We also know with certainty that they will remove plutonium from a 25 megawatt reactor within a few weeks," he said. It is "critical" that International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors be present when the fuel rods are removed to verify that plutonium is not diverted to the weapons program, he said.

There were reports Thursday from Vienna, where the IAEA is headquartered, that Pyongyang has told the agency it will remove fuel rods from one of its reactors soon and that the IAEA could send a team to watch.

Shortly before leaving for Japan, Perry visited U.S. and South Korean military units near the Demilitarized Zone.